How Can Taiwan Find Its Own Way After 1997

April 1, 1997

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with Sec. 10(1) of the National Development Act of 1996, it is my honor to transmit to you, and through you to the Executive and Legislative Yuan, the NDC-041997 report-----"How Can Taiwan Find Its Own Way After 1997."

This report is designed to provide Mr. President, Prime Minister, and Legislators a broad base of considerations about the cross-Strait relations, Taiwan’s politics and economy, and Taiwan’s international identity over next five years.

The fundamental dispute between the PRC and Taiwan is Taiwan’s sovereignty issue and Taiwan’s status in the international community, such as "is Taiwan a country with full sovereignty? Or is Taiwan just a province of the PRC?" With the death of Deng Xiaoping and Hong Kong’s returning to the PRC, Taiwan issue has become more and more urgent for Beijing’s leaders. This issue will matter to Taiwan’s political and economic development in the future, even to our next generation. Facing future uncertainties, we must have a complete preparation to cope with any challenge. This report puts all considerations together in a convenient and clear format about the policy objectives and redefine the priority in making future policy to solve the problem we are facing now.

Under the current circumstance, Taiwan can no longer have an effective approach to counteract the PRC’s fast growing economic and military threats. In addition, timing is more and more important for us to make a feasible policy, because time is not on our side. Thus the government has the responsibility to create a better political and economic environment for 21.5 million people. This report recommend that the government should courageously declare that the Republic of China on Taiwan is an independent country with complete sovereignty.

Mr. President, the National Development Council is proud to call your attention to the fact that this approach can not only solve the problem of Taiwan’s international identity, but also maintain Taiwan’s democratic development and economic prosperity. Finally, this approach will prevent Taiwan from becoming the second Hong Kong after 1997. My National Development Council colleagues and I hope that you and Executive or Legislative Yuan would continue to find this report useful as you seek solutions to our national problems.

Respectfully yours,

Although Deng’s death can not change the PRC’s Taiwan policy much, his death indicates that cross-Strait relations will lose its base of national emotion, and go into a more pragmatic stage. That means the PRC will deal with Taiwan issue by harder means. The Beijing leaders will not wait on the basis of national emotion, especially after Hong Kong returning to mainland. As a result, how can Taiwan find its own way after 1997 is the problem we need to solve now.

Aiming at this policy problem, I set four major objectives whose priority is described as the following sequence: (1) to prevent Taiwan from becoming the second Hong Kong after 1997, (2) to maintain Taiwan’s democratic development and economic prosperity, (3) to promote Taiwan’s status in the international community, and (4) to reduce tension across the Taiwan Strait. And I analyzed this problem under five assumptions: (1) Keeping the Kuomintang (KMT) as the ruling party until 2001. (2) Hong Kong and Macao will be returned to China in 1997 and 1999 respectively. (3) The PRC insists on "one country, two systems" policy toward Taiwan. (4) Beijing does not renounce invading Taiwan by force. (5) Beijing continues to blockade Taipei’s international activity space. Also there are some domestic and external constraints I have to mention, and they are (1) the PRC’s military build-up, (2) Taiwan’s economic dependence on mainland, (3) the politics on Taiwan, (4) U.S. policy toward Taiwan, and (5) the time constraint. This paper indicates that time is the most significant element in the policy-making process.

My policy alternatives in addressing the problem of how can Taiwan find its own way after 1997 are: (1) status quo, (2) one divided China—two Chinas, seek unification, (3) Taiwan independence—one China, one Taiwan, (4) Unification—one China, two systems. I measure these alternatives against my criteria which are potential cost, feasibility, acceptability, and a time frame. After careful analysis of the alternatives, my concluding policy recommendation is the second alternative—one divided China, seek unification. This is a measure that the government have to make a formal declaration that ROC is a sovereign nation-state and China was divided into the PRC and ROC in 1949. But China will be unified when two sides of the Taiwan Strait are willing to have peace-talks. This policy is a feasible and effective way of solving Taiwan’s identity and the fundamental dispute across the Taiwan Strait.

Implementation of this policy will include the cooperation among the three major parties in Taiwan, especially the KMT and CNP (Chinese New Party) whose political doctrine is unification with mainland, building a national consensus on this issue, and mobilizing all military forces and rising their vigilance; internationally, the government have to apply for joining the United Nations, and declare that ROC is an independent country when the PRC vetoes Taiwan’s application to the UN. At the same time, our government and 21 million people should be ready to sustain a limited war for a least three months, and sacrifice some economic achievements. In order to gain permanent freedom, human rights, and prosperity, we need to do it.

Evaluation and monitoring are also essential for the success of this policy recommendation. A survey team will be organized by major figures from National Development Council, National Security, and some legislators appointed by the President. They will watch any change in both domestic and external environments, such as internal political instability or the indifference of United States. This team will consider any factor that will affect policy implementation and reassess the policy.

To implement this policy, every citizen of the ROC is needed to join and support it. Every person in this island is an actor, we should care about our future together and think about our next generation. I believe our efforts and sacrifice must be worth.

The confrontation between the ROC (Republic of China on Taiwan) and the PRC (People’s Republic of China) across the Taiwan Strait began in 1949, when the Nationalist government lost the civil war and retreated to the island of Taiwan. Since then both regimes have attempted several times to defeat the other and to reunify China. Before the 1980s, our government adopted "three no" policy¾ no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise¾ under the Hallstein Doctrine, whereas the PRC insisted on attacking Taiwan by force. There were several military conflicts occurring during that period of time, and the 1958 Kinmen (Quemoy) crisis was a larger one in magnitude. On January 1, 1979, Beijing stopped shelling Kinmen and Matsu, and started calling for direct postal, trade, and travel links and other interchanges across Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, our government responded by proposing the reunification of China under Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People. Since the late 1980s, however, the relationship between the ROC and PRC has undergone significant changes. Essentially, both sides have moved from military confrontation to more conciliatory interaction. The Beijing regime has shifted from an uncompromising one-China policy to a slightly more accommodating policy of one China with two socioeconomic systems. Also the former president Chiang Ching-kuo began to permit visits, cultural exchange and indirect trade with mainland. Especially, after the Koo-Wang talks in 1993, tensions in the Taiwan Straits were reduced dramatically, and all kinds of exchanges between two sides increased rapidly.

Beijing’s positions toward Taiwan in the last decade may be summed up as (1) one country, two systems, (2) peaceful unification but making no commitment to renounce the

use of force against Taiwan, and (3) party-to-party negotiations. Even though president Jiang Zemin of the PRC delivered an eight-point speech on the Chinese unification issue on January 30, 1995, and the tone was basically conciliatory, he still argued "one China, two systems," and Beijing is the sole legal government of China. On the other hand, our president Lee Teng-hui responded to Jiang’s speech in a six-point proposal. President Lee noted that in 1991 Taiwan formally renounced its use of force against the mainland and hoped that the PRC would publicly forego any intention of attacking Taiwan by force. Moreover, he called for both sides to join international organizations; thus leaders of two sides could naturally meet each other on equal footing on certain occasions. Unfortunately, Beijing thought Lee’s responses lacked "sincerity," and his proposals actually asked the PRC to recognize two Chinas.

Under these circumstances, Taiwan authority and Beijing regime haven’t yet had any consensus on sovereignty and legitimacy. Furthermore, in order to break out of Beijing’s imposed diplomatic isolation, President Lee has actively pushed so-called "pragmatic diplomacy" in recent years, and Taipei has also decided to coexist with Beijing in the IGOs. Taipei’s changes in its foreign policy, at the same time, have irritate Beijing. Particularly, President Lee’s private visit to the United States in June 1995 was really

disturbing to Beijing leaders. Consequently, Beijing launched wave after wave of rhetoric against President Lee, accusing him of engaging in activities which aimed to create "two Chinas," "one China, one Taiwan," or "Taiwan independence." And holding a series of military exercises and missile tests in the Taiwan Strait threatened Taiwan. The recent crisis in the Taiwan Strait has not only brought cross-Strait relations to their lowest point since the 1958 Kinmen crisis, but also threatened to involve the United States in military confrontation with the PRC. Right now, the rain is over, but as far as cross-Strait relations are concerned, the sky has yet to become blue.

Meanwhile, cross-Strait relations remain in the impasse and the dialogue between two sides was not reopened yet. Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of the PRC, was dead on February 19, 1997, and Hong Kong¾ one of Asia’s most vigorous economies and most free societies¾ will fall under PRC’s flag on July 1, 1997. These factors cause Taiwan, our government, to face new uncertainties in the future.

In the post-Deng era, despite the disparate and competing interests of Beijing’s leaders¾ who are divided by regional prejudices, differing economic strategies, military pressures and ideological divides¾ the single flag around which the leadership rallies is the banner of nationalism. And at the heart of this nationalist passion is the goal of retaking Taiwan, especially after taking over Hong Kong. Actually, the PRC leaders want offer Hong Kong as an example of how Taiwan could return to China while retaining its distinctive way of life, i. e., one country, two systems. However, who knows that the PRC

could really keep Hong Kong’s socioeconomic system the same for 50 years. Some China’s actions have caused anxiety in Hong Kong and around the world, such as China’s decision to trash Hong Kong’s freely and fairly elected Legislative Council, and scrap Hong Kong’s Bill of Rights and its Societies and Public Order Ordinances. In addition, ROC on Taiwan, an actually existing sovereign state, is different from Hong Kong, a British colony. Therefore, we have to prevent Taiwan from becoming the second Hong Kong after 1997. We must find our own way to survive in the international society, because we can’t accept " one country, two systems." As the director of the National Development Council, I attempt to analyze and answer the policy problem: How can Taiwan find its own way after 1997?

I set the policy objectives and the sequence of priority as the following: (1) to prevent Taiwan from becoming the second Hong Kong after 1997, (2) to maintain Taiwan’s democratic development and economic prosperity, (3) to promote Taiwan’s status in the international community, and (4) to reduce tension across the Taiwan Strait.

This policy analysis is under the following assumptions: (1) Keeping the Kuomintang (KMT) as the ruling party until 2001. (2) Hong Kong and Macao will be returned to China in 1997 and 1999 respectively. (3) The PRC insists on "one country, two systems" policy toward Taiwan. (4) Beijing does not renounce invading Taiwan by force. (5)Beijing continues to blockade Taipei’s international activity space.

Since Deng Xiaoping advocated "four modernizations" in 1979, the defense spending of the PRC has been increasingly growing every year (see Figure1). Additionally, China’s current defense strategy has been designed "to accelerate the modernization of its war potential and its capacity to mobilize from peace time to wartime in emergencies." One such emergency, of course, may be the forcible reunification of Taiwan. China’s first military objective would be to close Taiwan’s ports; the second would be so to damage Taiwan’s logistical support base and morale that its military could not resist an invasion; the third would be to invade Taiwan itself. Thus, China requires more than the ability to cross the Taiwan Strait with a strong invasion force¾ it needs achieve sufficient air and sea control in the theater and close all avenues of external support to Taiwan. At the same time, the PRC needs strong amphibious capability to land in Taiwan ‘s western coast.

Looking at Table 1, I believe that our ground forces can defeat the PLA once some of them have landed in Taiwan’s coastal areas, even though the PLA could transport two or three divisions across Taiwan Strait.

Equipment	China	Taiwan
Personnel Main battle tanks Light tanks Armored fighting vehicles/ Armored personnel carriers Towed artillery Multiple rocket launchers Self-propelled artillery	2,200,000 7,500-8,000 1,200 4,500 14,500 3,800 some	240,000 870+ 905 225/ 950 1,060 some 315

As to the air forces (see Table 2), Taiwan is modernizing its fighter forces with F-16A/Bs, Mirage 2000-5Ei/Dis, and self-built IDFs. Once the final deliveries of these aircraft are made, Taiwan’s air force will surpass China’s temporarily, even when one includes the full procurement of 72 Su-27s and about 124-140 J-8s.

Navy (see Table 3) and ballistic missiles would be the problems. Today, China has the world’s third largest navy, and its quantity and quality obviously exceed ours. It will be able to blockade Taiwan’s sea lanes if China launches attacking against Taiwan. Moreover, China’s navy is still continuing to expand, especially purchasing advanced submarines and frigates from Russia, and it might obtain airplane carrier someday. Unlike air operations, a Chinese ballistic-missile attack could not be easily blunted by Taiwan’s defenses. With a range of 600 km, China’s DF-15 (M-9) mobile solid-propellant ballistic missiles based on Fujian could easily strike targets throughout Taiwan. Recalling PLA’s missile tests in the March 1996 (see Map 1), we can understand it’s an obvious threat to our air defense. Although we have bought a Modified Air Defense System (MADS) based on major elements of the Patriot system, I think in any event, there is no indication that Taiwanese efforts to destroy DF-15 missiles would fare any better than U.S. efforts to destroy Iraqi Scud missiles in 1991.

Equipment	China	Taiwan
Submarines	86+	4
Destroyers	18+	20
Frigates	34	11+
Corvettes		9+
Missile craft	187+	53+
Mine warfare	34 (T-43)	13+

Map 1 (Graphic by Thomas J. Timmons)

After Taiwan authority permitted people’s indirect investment in the mainland China, Taiwanese capital has been flowing significantly to China, because of China’s huge market, cheaper resources and labors. This trend causes Taiwan’s economy, especially exports, is more and more dependent on mainland market. We can estimate that this tendency will continue to develop on the basis of Figure 2 and it has given the PRC some economic leverage over Taiwan and thus over local political affairs.

For instance, in February 1994 a report of the ROC Military Intelligence Bureau indicating that the CCP’s strategy was to "achieve Chinese reunification through closer cross-Strait economic ties" and that Beijing has "consistently tried to associate cross-Strait economic links with political missions, hoping to attain political goals through economic means." Indeed, An Min, the director of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation’s Department of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan Affairs, has been quoted as saying that the ultimate aim of cross-Strait economic cooperation is political reunification. An’s Views are shared by Jiang Zemin who has said that the right time for reunification is when Taiwan’s economy is bound to the mainland. That’s why Beijing takes a pragmatic approach to economic dealings with Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwan’s excessive economic

dependence on China has indicated that Beijing will probably use the economic leverage to gain political interests or bargaining chips. In a word, the PRC is the overall winner in political and economic terms.

In 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo abolished the prohibition of political party and accordingly adopted a series of political reforms to reach true democracy in Taiwan; consequently, an authoritative party—KMT—has disappeared gradually (see Figure3). This kind of distribution of political resources makes the KMT need to negotiate or cooperate with other parties to carry out policies. As a result, despite KMT as the ruling party now, the other two major parties—DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) and CNP (Chinese New Party)—still possess their powerful influences. Further, Taiwan’s society has become democratic and open, and people’s opinions should be considered and respected, when government setting any policy. So far, promoting Taiwan’s international status could be the main goal of these three major parties. Also our people has pressed government to solve its international identity problem by actively participating or reentering international organizations, such as UN or WTO. However, the PRC adopts all means, including threat of using military force, to blockade and isolate Taiwan in the international stage, and Beijing’s actions have made Taiwan (people) face a dilemma. That’s why when we look at figure4, we can find out most people are inclined to support middle line policy—status quo, but not permanent status quo. In addition, they don’t prefer immediate unification, either. In short, they long for Taiwan’ status promotion; however, facing PRC’s pressure, the only option they can choose is status quo, waiting for miracle or chance.

On the other hand, examining people’s attitudes on unification/independence issue from generation angle, Table 4 and Figure 5 show us some implications. First, younger generations tended to be more willing to change if changes in the environment required them to do so, as the proportion of the "wait and see" category increased with each descending generation. Second, older generations leaned more heavily on the "non-attitude" answer; they are unwilling to speak out or they did not have opinion. Third, the percentage of respondents seeking unification increased dramatically in the youngest group compared to the other three generations. Finally, totals tell us that most people are still inclined to maintain status quo, wait and see or seek unification, and they don’t prefer immediate independence or unification. Combining the figure 4 and table 4, there is a trend indicates that most people change their minds under different external environments, especially China’s actions. Therefore, I believe that most people won’t accept China’s rule or one country, two systems in the next five years.

Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taipei.

U.S. Policy Toward the Taiwan Issue

After the U.S. recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China, U.S. policy toward Taiwan’s security is outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. According to the TRA, the U.S. will provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive natures; and it will maintain its capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social and economic systems of the people on Taiwan. The TRA expresses U.S. concerns for Taiwan’s security, but allow the U.S. response to any threat or invasion from mainland China to be flexible. In other words, the TRA provides the U.S. with an option to defend Taiwan, but does not necessarily commit the U.S. to Taiwan’s defense. In the recent Taiwan Strait Crisis, U.S. officials all cited U.S. security commitments to Taiwan under the TRA, but refused to say what specific actions the U.S. would take should Beijing attack Taiwan. This ambiguous attitude of U.S. officials on U.S. security commitments to Taiwan have been euphemistically dubbed "strategic ambiguity."

On the other hand, American pubic support for the use of military force overseas also depends upon different cases and situations. A Louis-Harris poll taken after tensions in the Taiwan Strait heated up showed 71% of the respondents opposed U.S. military actions to defend Taiwan against a PRC invasion. Therefore, how could we be sure that the U.S. will send forces to defend Taiwan in the future?

In the cross-Strait rivalry, the PRC is top dog, and Taiwan is underdog, especially after China’s economic reform and its military build-up. With the increase in military budget ( see Figure 1, p. 8) and the upgrading of PLA, the balance of military power between the PRC and Taiwan has been gradually disadvantageous to Taiwan. In addition, China’s taking economic reform has boosted China’s economy, and made China become the world’s 11^th largest trade country( Taiwan ranks the 13^th) recently. China’s rapid economic development also cause Taiwan’s economic dependence on China, particularly trades through Hong Kong. Because most Taiwan exports are through Hong Kong to mainland China, after Hong Kong returning to China, Taiwan will face a policy dilemma—whether it should insist on indirect contact policy. And Beijing will certainly use its economic leverage to force Taiwan to concede in the future negotiations. Plus the PRC is actively improving its relations with Russia, and purchases numbers of advanced weapons from Russia. Accordingly, it is clear that time is not on our side.

The criteria are (1) potential cost, (2) economic, social , political, and military feasibility, (3) acceptability, and (4) timing.

Policy Alternatives and Test

In this section, I will formulate and examine each of the four alternatives: (1) status quo, (2) one divided China—two Chinas, seek unification, (3) Taiwan independence—one China, one Taiwan, (4) Unification—one China, two systems. I will try to measure each alternative against objectives and criteria.

This alternative means our government will remain the indirect contact with the PRC under the three conditions set by the Guideline for National Unification. This alternative can satisfy the fourth objective—reduce tension between the PRC and Taiwan, but Taiwan might become the second Hong Kong after 1997; it can not promote Taiwan’s status at all since all things remain the same. In the short run, Taiwan may keep its democratic and economic development, but when the PRC having more powerful military capability ( the PLA will finish its modernization by 2007) and economic predominance, Taiwan will eventually be more vulnerable to China’s threats. As a result, "status quo" will cost less economic, social, political, and military costs in the short term; however, it will let Taiwan go into a wrong way in the long term. Especially after Hong Kong and Macao returning to the PRC, Taiwan would be the PRC’s next target. In short, this alternative is feasible now, but not feasible or acceptable after 1997 or 1999.

This alternative means our government should formally declare that the Republic of China (on Taiwan) is an independent country, not just a political entity, and China was divided into the PRC and ROC which are ruled separately by two different central governments. But we still seek unification in the future when differences between two sides decrease and two Chinas are willing to negotiate peacefully. In the past, both Taiwan and the PRC argue "one China" with different definitions—Beijing indicates that one China is the PRC, but Taiwan argues that one China is a historical China—and this situation made most countries misunderstand that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. Certainly, we can’t accept this kind of "verbal annexation," and we have to avoid this verbal trap.

This scenario is more pragmatic and clear to express the recent situation across the Taiwan Strait, and creates "two Chinas" model as recent "two Koreas" and former "two Germanys" or " two Vietnams." This alternative can prevent Taiwan from being the second Hong Kong, and can promote Taiwan’s international status. It may be a little difficult to estimate how soon the major powers will recognize our declaration, but I believe this alternative should be able to obtain more external and domestic support than Taiwan independence. In terms of western powers’ ideology, Taiwan’s current political and socioeconomic systems are closer to the western, so I think most of them finally will understand Taiwan’s situation. Consequently, this could be the last chance for Taiwan to obtain its nationhood as Taiwan still owns marginal military advantage over the PRC, and Taiwan’s economy hasn’t been deeply trapped by mainland market.

On the contrary, the PRC would deny our declaration and might take military action toward Taiwan. Thus, Taiwan’s 21.5 million people would probably have to face a limited war against the PLA and sacrifice some economic achievements. In terms of public opinions, we can find that most people ( maintain status quo, wait and see plus seek unification are over 50%) have no fixed standing through the figure 4 and table 4. That’s because their thinking dances with the PRC’s music. However, if the PRC insists on its "one China, two systems" or "forcible reunification" policies toward Taiwan, these people

and those who support Taiwan independence and have no attitude would be inclined to support this alternative. In general, this alternative is highly feasible and acceptable, even though the cost is a little higher in the short run.

Taiwan Independence—One China, One Taiwan.

This alternative is to establish a Republic of Taiwan and rule out any probability of unification. This scenario will create a "one China, one Taiwan" model. It also satisfies the first and third objectives, and its short term outcome may be almost the same as the second alternative—one divided China. However, it veers away from the ruling party’s (KMT) doctrines, and contributes to the DPP ( a party advocating Taiwan independence) becoming the only beneficiary. The more important is that only 15% to 20% of Taiwan people (see figure 4 and table 4) support Taiwan independence, and the PRC would launch military attack against Taiwan without hesitating. Therefore, this alternative is a little feasible but its cost would be higher than the second alternative, and it’s less acceptable.

This alternative means that Taiwan will finally be unified by the PRC and become a special administrative area of the PRC. Taiwan’s status will be like Hong Kong and Taiwan will lose its international status. Although this alternative can completely remove the tension across the Taiwan Strait and preserve Taiwan’s political and socioeconomic systems, it is against the first and third objectives. Furthermore, nobody knows that how long the PRC will keep its promise. But when we recall the past experiences of negotiation with the CCP and the PRC’s recent actions toward Hong Kong, we can’t the PRC completely. Once we accept "one country, two systems," Taiwan issue will become the domestic affair of the PRC, and it can do what it wants toward Taiwan. Therefore, this alternative is unacceptable and infeasible due to its large potential cost.

After testing each alternative and matrix analysis (see matrix below), I find that the second alternative is the best choice and the first alternative is the second choice. Most people and our government may choose the first alternative—status quo, but when we consider timing, we will find that time is limited for us. Today, Taiwan can no longer have any effective approach to cope with increasing economic or military threats from the PRC. With time passing, we gets less and less advantages, so the status quo option could only satisfy the objectives superficially and temporarily. Thus, I recommend the government to adopt the second alternative—one divided China, two Chinas, seek unification, and declare formally and officially that ROC (on Taiwan) is an independent nation.

To implement this policy alternative, the KMT needs to express its willingness to exchange opinions about Taiwan’s future with the DPP and the CNP, especially the CNP whose main doctrine is to accomplish unification; in addition, the KMT has to explain this policy’s final goal which is to seek unification. Furthermore, the KMT could invite CNP’s major figures and the DPP’s to join the policy implementation. Then, the government should educate people that why status quo is not the best long term policy, and why the government needs to carry out this policy. The most important thing is to build a national consensus that ROC is an independent country, not a part of the PRC. At the same time, the President have to order all military forces to maintain highly vigilant and cope with any emergency. Accelerating R&D in weaponry and increasing weapon purchasing channels are imminent, too.

Internationally, the government should continue to make effort to join any international organization, especially the UN. Certainly the PRC will veto Taiwan’s application to the UN, and meanwhile, our government can declare formally that ROC is an independent country and China has been divided into the PRC and the ROC sine 1949. We can also ask the rest of world why Taiwan should be always rejected in the international community and gain international support through international propaganda. Of course, this behavior must irritate Beijing, so the PLA might use force to threaten or really attack Taiwan. However, I believe in terms of Taiwan’s current military capability, we could resist without any external support for at least three months. In that time, international pubic opinions less or more will push major powers to intervene the conflict, because many multinational companies have economic interests in Taiwan and most Asia countries will worry about the result of the "China threat." Therefore, we could have more chance to negotiate with the PRC in the international occasion. Finally, If we don’t want to be the second Hong Kong, we must pay some cost temporarily. I think in order to gain permanent freedom, honor, and prosperity, our sacrifice and efforts would be worth.

Basically, this policy implementation would be affected by domestic pubic opinion and international environment, so some crucial persons of National Development Council and National Security Council, and several legislators will establish a survey team to monitor and evaluate the policy implementation. They will collect and analyze all survey data about the reaction from public opinion. Concentration on data from the past 2-3 years is necessary as a base of comparison to identify the success of this policy. Beside the public opinion, the team also needs to pay attention to the cooperation among the three major parties—KMT, DPP, and CNP. As to the external environment, U.S. attitude would be important for carrying out this policy recommendation. If the U.S. objects intensely or shows indifference to Taiwan’s policy—one divided China, an independent ROC, we should reevaluate the policy. In short, the survey team will be responsible for checking any factor that that will affect policy implementation and reassess the policy.

Central Daily News (Taipei), February 23, 1997

China Post (Taipei), March 1, 1994

China Times (Taipei), September 8, 1995

Daily Report (China) January 30, 1995

Lianhe bao (Taipei), August 5, 1993 & March 1, 1994

Newsweek, March 3, 1777

New York Times, February 20, 1997

The Free China Journal 12, no. 13, April 14, 1995

World Journal (NY), February 23, 1997